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CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OP 
EVERYDAY LIFE:
THEIR RELATION TO ABNORMAL MENTAL PHENOMENA.
’Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse
I
unacted desires  .... Blake.
(8)
(3)
THE FOREWORD.
* Mankind has a bad ear for new music
Nietzsche
The fundamental difference between the old and the new psycho­
logy lies in the fact that, in the former, the part played by 
feeling in relation to mental processes is a subordinate one, 
whereas, in the latter, it occupies in this connection a very 
prominent place. The play, so to speak, of our feelings deter - 
mines, to a great extent, our mental processes: and if, through 
the Interference of the censor of consciousness, no direct play 
be allowed, then the manifestation of such feelings may be traced 
indirectly. But if we maintain that feeling plays such a large 
part in the determination of mental processes, then we are only 
paying a way for the doctrine of rigid determinism in thought and 
action, and here we are face to face with a great stumbling - 
block, at leasty as far as the ordinary individual is concerned. 
Even if one only endeavours to demonstrate to him the fact that
(4).
ittuoh can be said for the deterministic theory, his pride is 
hurt* He likes to think, and with good reason, that his. thoughts 
and acts are volitional. So far, our remarks on the attitude of 
the ordinary individual apply only to processes which are con­
scious. What about those that are unconscious ?. Let us first 
deal with the average man. Per him, unconscious processes might 
be non-existent. He never seeks to explain them, nay, thinks it 
folly on the part of anyone to attempt to explain them, for he 
regards them as meaningless and therefore, in his eyes, any 
attempted explanation can only be attended with fruitless results 
For the determinist, however, they are subject to as rigorous a 
determinism as are processes in consciousness. On the one hauid, 
then, we have those to whom conscious processes are volitional, 
but to whom a].)., or nearly all, unconscious processes are meem- 
ingless; and, on the other hand, those to whom conscious and 
unconscious processes are alike subject to a rigorous determin­
ism. Incompatible as these theories seem, it may be that a
solution of the problem is to be found in accepting the determ-
(6).
inlstio theory as far as unconscious processes are concerned, 
the truth of which it is partly the purpose of this thesis to 
demonstrate, in conjunction with the volitional theory where * 
conscious processes hold sway. The difficulty lies in the 
illusion that because in conscious processes we exercise free­
will, that, therefore, free-will plays a large part in our con­
scious processes. Here we must leave the matter for the present, 
as it is not the object of this thesis to answer the vexed 
question of determinism and free-will. It is sufficient that we 
are now able to recognise clearly two distinct classes; first, 
those who attach little or no significance to unconscious pro­
cesses, these forming by far the great majority; and second, 
those who not only attach great #lgalfl0#noe to such processes 
in themselves, but who regard them as being very pertinent to 
processes taking place in consciousness.
It is to this latter class that Professor F^ eud,^  of 
Vienna,t belongs^ and as a member of which he has done such
(6).
Heroulean work as far as psychology is concerned* Briefly stated, 
the points in Pz#ud*s psychology which concern us here are four 
in number. Firsts he assigns a rigorous determinism to all 
psychical events; second, he states as a tentative hypothesis^ 
that there is to be assigned to each psychical event what he I 
Galls an "affect”, varying in quantity and possessing a certain 
degree of independence in its attachments; third, every psyohioal 
event is accompanied by a certain amount of energy, the over- 
acciuBulation of which leads towards abnormal mental functioning I 
and the discharge of which is accompanied by the sensation of |
relief; finally, inasmuch as feeling plays such a large part in |
i
the psychology of the individual, he regards unconscious pro­
cesses as the expression of our feelings or desires, which, of 
course, need not necessarily be gratified in consciousness. This 
last hypothesis he further elaborates in order to show the
* His views are expounded in his numerous writings, the most 
important of which, in the present connection, are*Die Traum-
deutung*, *Drei Abhandlungen ziir Sexual the or 1© *, and with 
(Breuer) *Studien uber Hysterie*.
(7).
the mechanisms which are at work in the cons true Jïion of mental 
processes. One of these mechanisms oommancLs our attention at 
present, a knowledge of it being necessary to a proper under­
standing of this thesis. If gratification is denied to a 
feeling, or, in other words, to an unconscious wish, through 
the censorial influence of consciousness, more conveniently 
termed the psychical censor, then what is known as •repression’ 
of that wish occurs, the amount of repression depending partly 
on the strength of the wish, partly on the strength of the 
censor,
A wish, then, may be successfully repressed, but it is 
not to be inferred that it is therefore rendered inactive. It 
still plays an active part in mental life, even though it 
remains for all time insufficiently active to overcome the
I
psychical censor. If, then, it be not erubjeoted to repression, 
it appears direct in consciousness ; whereas, if, owing to the 
strength of the psychical censor, an unconscious wish prove
(8).
scarcely strong enough to find direct expression in conscious­
ness, it will manifest itself therein indirectly*
That this mechanism holds good in certain normal and 
abnormal mental processes and that it explains many hitherto 
seemingly absurd phenomena occurring in insane states, it is our 
endeavour to prove* A word may be conveniently said here, how­
ever, as to the justification of the adoption of these hypo­
thèse^ for though we shall, by personal experience and personal 
observation, prove their correctness, it is as well to offer 
some show of reason for the use of such terms as psychical 
censor, intrapsychical conflict, and the like*
In the elucidation of any problem. Science demands 
a very definite method of arriving at the truth* If we turn our 
minds, for example, to the subject of acquired immunity, we 
find, as the method adopted in the solution of this problem, 
first, a collection of facts; second, a classification of these 
facts; third, the construction of a theory designed to explain
these facts* The theory propounded need not necessarily explain
(9).
all the known facts; it is sufficient if it lead to the estab­
lishment of fundamental laws relating to them. Ehrlich’s side- 
chain theory is of this nature, inasmuch as it does not explain 
active immunity apart from the presence of anti-substances in 
the serum. Nevertheless, Ehrlioh is entitled to speak of a 
molecule of protoplasm as being composed of a central atom 
group with a large number of side-chains. His ’atom- group* and 
’side-chains* have no real existences they w e  but figments b o m  
of his scientific imagination, and, as such, are comparable to 
the atoms of the chemist and the ether waves of the physicist. 
That they enable him to give a reasonable explanation of certain 
phenomena is sufficient Justification for postulating their 
existence. For exactly the same reason, such terms as were 
mentioned above are used in this script.
(10).
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I. Oontrlbutlons to the payohopathology of everyday life.
*• He who has eyes to see, and ears to hear, becomes 
convinced that mortals can hide no secret. Whoever 
is silent with the lips, tattles with the finger­
tips; betrayal oozes out of every pore" --  Freud.
(11).
THE FORQBTTIira OF GIVEN MEMORIES.
We are here only concerned with typical oases. If I fail
to recollect that I was accosted on the street yesterday by a boy 
who asked to be directed to the British Museum, there is nothing 
strange in my inability to remember the incident. I had no cause 
to remember it, and there is nothing psychopathological about my 
forgetting it. But if I forget my own name, or my brother's name, 
or if I set out from my house one morning to make a call in a 
eei^tain part of the city and find myself, after travelling some 
distance, not at, nor approaching my ^intended destination, but 
in some other quarter to which I had no conscious intention to go, 
then some explanation of such an unusual occurrence is necessary. 
It is not merely an unusual occurrence, it is a very definite 
psychopathological act.
We have one other consideration to talce into
I had almost said *desired* destination, but strictly speaking, 
this would have been incorrect, otherwise there had been no 
mistake. Our unconscious desires are, as will subsequently be 
shown, much stronger than our conscious ones.
(12).
account besides the fact that we are dealing with a given memory, 
and that is, that the person with whom we are dealing must not 
be subject to memory disturbances either quantitative or qualita­
tive# The forgotten memories of an alcoholic dement, for example, 
are not, for the present, to be compared with those of the normal 
individual.
Proper names furnish, perhaps, more striking instan­
ces of what we refer to, than anything else. Everyone has, at 
some time or other, had the experience of being suddenly unable 
to recall a hitherto well*known name. We think of the person, of 
his appearance, of where we last saw him, perhaps we even remem­
ber the name of a companion who accompanied him on that occasion, 
whom we had not previously met and whom w© have not since en­
countered, yet still we are baffled in our quest for the name.
We may get the length of saying that we think the name begins, 
for example, with a B, that we are sure it does, but still the 
name escapes us. Next day, perhaps, the name suddenly flashes
(13).
through ohr mind, and w© pause for an instant to think how 
curious it is that we forgot It. The incident then passes into 
oblivion; we never seek to explain such occurrence to ourselves, 
unless, perhaps, to add by way of explanation that memory plays 
us funny tricks sometimes.
1
Some time ago, I took up a card to send to a friend 
of mine, with whom I had been long and intimately acquainted.
I was taken by surprise, however, when I found that I could not 
recall his name. It was his Christian name I especially tried 
to remember, for I had always known him by such, and seldom was 
obliged to use his surname. I thought of him as I could see him 
in my mind's eye, of when and where I had last seen him, and so 
on, but no clue came to hand. Suddenly I recalled the surname, 
but the Christian name was as far off as ever. That I should be 
able to recall that portion of his name by which I seldom had 
cause to refer to him, seemed to me, at the time, a most unusual 
circumstance. I may say here that I was then unacquainted with
(14).
the mechanism involved in the forgetting of such memories. It 
was only after some twelve to fifteen hours had elapsed that I 
succeeded in recalling the Christian name. Why was this ? I can 
demonstrate the matter clearly enough. The full name of the 
individual in question was John Oalderwood, the latter part of 
which, as we noted above, I remembered before the former. 
Previous to knowing him, there had entered into, and had dis- 
appeared out of, my life, a person, by name John Burton Brown. 
Ever since this latter person passed out of my life, I have been 
unconsciously repressing all memories of him. To those who are 
unacquainted with psychical laws, this statement may appear 
paradoxical enough, as it seems to infer a contradiction in 
^ terms and that if a mental process of any kind takes place, it 
must, igso facto, take place in consciousness. That this as­
sumption is wrong, it will be my endeavour to demonstrate in 
these pages. Both persons had been known to me by their Christ­
ian names; but their Christian names were the same, and owing
( I B ) .
to the fact that that particular name, through its association
»
with the surname Brown, had been repressed into my unconscious 
I was unable to recall it in connection with the surname 
Oalderwood. Let me now explain how I came to this conclusion.
As has been mentioned above, the incident occurred before I was 
familiar with the Freudian mechanisms, and it was only after 
becoming acquainted with these that I reached a satisfactory 
explanation of my memory lapse. I took the Christian name John 
which I had forgotten, and which, as I thought, I had little 
reason to fOrget, and proceeded to associate to it. This en­
tails the putting down, in sequence, of the various thoughts 
that rise in one's mind when reacting to the word in question, 
oar© being taken to exorcise as little censorial influence 
over one's thoughts as is possible. The first association I 
gave was the French word Jean, then the corresponding feminine 
Jeannette. This made me think of a character I had lately seen
# The adjective used substantively, as in the writings of 
Brill, Jung and Freud.
(16).
in a dramatic sketch, and this in turn brought another character 
to mind, of the same name, whom I saw many years ago in an opera 
performed in the Athenaeum at Glasgow. My next thought was that 
my knowledge of the operas was by no means what I should like it 
to be and that I had often had had cause to regret this fact* My 
next association was the opera Faust, which was the one I had 
last witnessed, and following upon that, the person who had ac­
companied me on that occasion, viz, John Burton Brown. My 
associations carried me no further, and curiously enough, I
failed to recognise that I had already reached a iatisfactory
.
explanation of the difficulty • So I again began to associate 
to the Christian name John, and again arrived at a point at 
which the person John Burton Brown completely filled my thoughts 
This time I did notice that his Christian name was the same as 
the one I had forgotten, and it was only on re-reading my first 
associations that I found I had previously missed the same
* Association tests, as a rule, take a long time to complete 
and cover many pages. This one is cited in detail, because 
of its brevity.
(17).
result. Thus reaching of the same goal by two distinct routes 
rules out of account a mere coincidence. Furthermore, the overlook­
ing of John Burton Brown's identity in the first instance is not to 
be ascribed to chance. Such a mechanism is only too frequently 
adopted by the psychical censor in order to avoid disagreeable 
thoughts rising into consciousness.
It is here convenient to bring forward another point 
for our consideration, viz, the way in which an affect cleaves to a 
name* We are all aware that there are certain names we would not like 
to bear because of the affects accompanying them, and others again to 
which, for the like reason, we are partial. A good example of what I
mean is to be found in 'Julius Caesar' (Act. 3, Scene. 3) s -
Third Citizen- Your name, sir, truly.
Oinna. Truly, my name is Cinna.
Second Citizen. ‘ ' Tëàr hin to pieces; he's a conspirator#
Oinna. I am Cinna the poet, I am not Oinna the
conspirator.
Second Citizen. It is no matter; his name's Oinna; pluck but
his name out of his heart, and turn him going
*
Ah 'affect' may be defined as that which gives an idea its 
©motional tone. Of. page 6.
(18).
Again, every schoolboy knows, as Macaulay would have said, that 
there are anarchists and anarchists. Those who do not believe
!I Ch
in the'propogation by deed* methods are closely allied to such
individualists as Herbert Spencer and Harold Cox. Yet one has
I
always the greatest difficulty in getting people to understand 
I ( as a rule, discussion yields more heat than light upon the
{ subject) that an anarchist may be a highly respectable member
\
of a community. The difficulty lies, I think, not so much in 
ignorance, but in the affect accompanying the term.
Not long ago, I was discussing boys* Christian 
names with a friend, and I ventured to remark that 'Archie ' was 
a very suitable and pleasant- sounding neuae* He replied that he 
could not tolerate it, and I might have pursued the matter no 
further, had he not again introduced t%e name in question only 
to re-0xp#e8B strongly his disapproval of it. This aroused my 
curiosity sufficiently to test the Freudian mechanisms, for 
wherever one encounters a strong prejudice, one may suspect
(19).
some very touching reason for the same. I asked what objection 
he took to the name, but his only reply was that he did not like 
it. When I told him that he probably had had some unfortunate 
connection with some-one of that name, he did not deny it, but 
asked if one might not simply take a fancy or a dislike to a 
name. Two or three days later, however, he admitted that my 
surmise was correct, and gave me sufficient details in 
explanation.
It is worthy of notice that sellers of goods are 
well aware of the value of the affect attaching to a name. The 
*Phltee#&* Boot Company is an example of this kind, and many more 
might be added. Cryptograms, too, are made use of because they 
serve to hide painful affects.
At the present time, I have a patient in one of my 
wards, whose name I ought not to have forgotten because of his 
striking facial characteristics if for nothing else. The fact 
that he occupies a bed in one of my infirmary wards and that I
(80).
have boon attending him every day for a prolonged period makes 
my memory laps© all the more surprising. His name is 'Burton', 
and I need only point out that it is the same as the second 
Christian name of my one-time friend, John Burton Brown, referred 
to above# It is to be observed that, as a general rule, anything
ones forgotten tends to be forgotten again.
To a colleague of mine I one© had occasion to 
refer to a third party who had made a strong impression on me, 
but whose name I could not recall for a matter of twenty-four 
hours or so. The name in question was 'Gresham', and it was only 
after associating to the word, that I realised that I then had 
an outstanding account with the Gresham Publishing Company.
It is convenient to remark here upon another 
definitely psychopathological act. During my student life, it
was my misfortbne to find myself in an unenviable position
#
financially. Much time and much self-denial were necessary ere
# " ~ ~  '
The reader will excuse the frankness of this statement, in
the cause of science.
(81).
I could say farewell to my creditors. So much indeed, was this
the case, that for the past two years I would not allow an
account of any kind to be run up against me. I even sacrificed
my early morning newspaper in order to pay for it before 1 read
it. I am only now beginning to adopt a more reasonable attitide
in these matters. The over- scrupulous attitude here shown was
the result of over-doterminâtion and is undoubtedly a
defense mechanism, primarily conscious, secondarily unconscious,
*
in order to avert a like calamity. Bernard Hart defines an 
obsession as the "over-weighting" of a particular element in 
consciousness, and it is such instances as the above that lead 
us to the genesis of true obsessions. The 'washing mania' of 
which I will have to speak later, is due to the same mechanism 
symbolically expressed.
One of our greatest living writers, Anatole
*#
Prance, tells a story concerning Pontius Pilate. The incident
*
Psychology of Insanity p. 33$
**
Mother of Pesrl»
(82).
with which the story deals is supposed to have occurred when
f M
ho iras a man well-advanced in years. While travelling through 
the desert on one occasion he lights upon an old acquaintance, 
and, as two men should who hail from the same land, they spend 
an hour or two together in pleasant reminiscences. The acquaint- 
anoe has occasion to recall to Pilate's mind the trial of Jesus, 
and the story winds up dramatically enough with Pilate saying 
"Jesus. - Jesus - of Nazareth ? I cannot call him to mind". The 
associations centring around the trial in question must have 
been a source of great pain to Pilate. How well repression had 
forced them deep into his unconscious is here well illustrated.
Before we pass from the subject of proper 
names, one other point is wortliy of our attention. I refer to 
the common enough habit of oastîâg a slur upon a person by 
pretending to forget his name. I have heard a politician raise 
a titter amongst his audience by referring to his opponent in 
the election field as 'Mr. - Mr. - what's his name '. In such a
(S3 ).
cas© til© speaker acts as thou^ the name had suffered through 
repression. On the other hand, we feel rather pleased that our 
names are remembered, when we have little reason to expect that 
such will be the case.
The forgetting of words other than proper names may 
be just as important. While examining a row of books in a second­
hand bookshop in Oharing Cross Road one deiy, I picked up a volua< 
on 'Sleeplessness* and read therein the following lines -
'Blest be the man who first lnvenj;ed sleep.
But curst be he with curses loud and deep 
Who then invented, and went round advising.
An artificial, cut-off, early rising'.
They anused me much at the time and I committed them to memory
by repeating them to myself at odd intervals. The day following
I repeated then to a colleague with the exception of the word
'artificial', which I failed to remember. Associations to the
word brought to consciousness the fact that I had that day paid
a visit to my dentist, whose rooms, by the way, are also in
Oharing Cross Road, and that I had come away from him, thinking
(24).
what a pity it is to have a single artificial tooth in one's
head. Artificial   I can remember how the very word pained
me at the time.
The forgetting of articles, the carrying out of an 
intended purpose wrongly, and the forgetting to carry out an 
intended purpose are due to the same causes. Ihen travelling 
from Manchester to London one day last year, I made up my mind,
!
as the day was fine, to seek out a friend as soon as I arrived ; 
at my destination and spend the evening with him. I considered 
that I could leave my bag in the left-luggage office, but look­
ed upon my umbrella as a decided nuisance. On arriving at 
Euston, I would have left the latter behind, had not a fellow- 
paasenger directed my attention to it.
Last Christmas, I offered, by way of a present, to 
pay a dentist's bill. A day or two later, I found that my offer
had been somewhat rash, and that I could barely undertake the I
i
expense. I promptly forgot all about it, and several weeks
(86).
had elapsed ere my brother introduced the matter in conversation 
and I was reminded of my unfulfilled promise* Similarly, bills are 
frequently mislaid, cheques but seldom*
Those who have witnessed Bernard Shaw*s*Oaesap and
Cleopatra* cannot fail to remember how upset Caesar becomes, as
his
the hour ofdeparture arrives* He has forgotten something, and 
feels very euinoyed with himself on this account* Finally he remem­
bers what it is - to say goodbye to Cleopatra# This showing to the
world at large that she had suffered repression into his unoon-
■
scious, and thus expressing his opinion of her, is a very delicate 
method of disparagement, and is similar to the pretended forgetting 
of names*
Saving occasion to appear at Bow Street one day, in 
connection with a deportation order, I enquired of my colleagues 
the most convenient way to travel* I was advised to alight at 
Holborn tube station, have ray lunch in one of the neighbouring | 
restaurants, and proceed to the Court* I duly set forth, but when 
I first realised what I was doing, i found myself, after having
(26).
alighted at Piccadilly, which ia three stations beyond Holborn, 
walking towards the restaurant I usually frequent when off duty, 
The erroneously carried out act indicates where I would rather 
have been at the time.
I Lr: / ; or.
Before you venture f<).r I. could you
to tmt thai- I ari;' rorAW,\.'y'L\;
But It voo take æo ^Ipu & alu.
One half of no the other 000^^; -
T xoti hut if voore*
Ann . . ut: :
By her lapsus. Itngu&g, ho #hioh t;
(27).
MISTAKES IN SPEAKING.
Mistakes in speaking are pregnant with meaning* An
excellent example is afforded us in *The Merchant of Venice*,
(Act*3, Scene S), in which Portia says : -
*There is something tells me, but it is not love,
I would not lose you; and you know yourself 
Hate counsels not in such a quality:
But lest you should not understand me well,
(And yet a maiden hath no tongue but thought)
I would detain you here some month or two.
Before you venture for me* I could teach you 
How to choose right, but then I am forsworn;
So will I never be; so may you miss me ;
But if you do, you’ll make me wish a sin.
That I had been forsworn. Beshrew your ©yes.
They have overlooked me, and divided me;
One half of me is yours, the other half yours, - 
Mine own, I would say; but if mine, then yours, - 
And so all yours*•
By her lapsus linguae, in which she tells 
Bassanio that she is already his, Portia allays her suitor’s 
anxiety*
What is known at Oxford as a Spoonerism, so called on 
account of a distinguished professor who frequently committed the
I
(28).
error, is the ooraraon mistake of replacing the initial letter or 
letters of a word by those of a succeeding word, usually taken froni| 
the same sentence.
While making a mental examination of a patient under 
my care, I obtained an anamnesis in order to test his memory. Ho 
had occasion to point out to me that he had made a mistake in say­
ing that he had been at home prior to his admission to the asylum.
I knew, of course, that this was so. In making his statement, how­
ever, he said *miscape* for ’mistake* and I at once concluded that i 
he was either meditating etn escape from the asylum, or that he had !
i
escaped from the poorhouse infirmary, which had been his place of | 
residence prior to admission. The latter was the more probable sup-! 
position for the simple reason that he had omitted all mention of 
that institution when giving me his history. I at once taxed him 
with having taken French leave of that place. He hesitated, became 
agitated, and finally, with some sense of shame, admitted the 
truth of ray statement.
(89)
When returning from Glasgow to London recently, the day 
being particularly fine, I was loth to spend time in travelling. 
However, I had no option in the matter, and approaching the book­
stall in the Central Station, I asked, amongst other things, for
i  ■  ,
i the ’Telegraph* instead of the ’Herald’. Thus, in my lapsus
I
j linguae, I expressed very pointedly my feelings in connection with
i
the long journey that was before me.
While sp6ailing to a colleague of mine who was a 
candidate for an asylum post in Wales, for which a knowledge of 
Welsh was a necessity. I said to him, "So if you feel that your 
knowledge of French is good" etc., substituting the word ’French 
for the word ’Welsh. The error that I had fallen into would have 
escaped me, had not my attention been called to it. I made a men­
tal note of the mistake, and later, found on associating to the 
word •French’ that only that morning I had expressed the regret 
that my knowledge of French was not sufficient to allow me to
speak it fluently.
(so),
and that I had pondered over various methods of remedying this 
deficiency.
One day, when taking a very full anamnesis from a 
patient as a preliminary to submitting her to a psycho-analytic­
al investigation, I had occasion to ask her at what ages her 
parents had respectively married. She told me that her father was 
then twenty-two years of age, but that she could not say how old 
her mother had been. She gave me the year of their marriage, 
however, and her mother’s age at death. Thinking to get what I 
wanted, viz- her mother’s marrying age, by means of a little 
arithmetic, I asked her in what year her mother had died. To this 
she did not at first reply, but later said questioningly, more 
to herself than to me "1S22"T, and then, "No, No; how stupid of 
me: she was married in 1861". But when I thought of it thus 
18 - 22, I felt certain I had got the information I desired. I 
assumed her mother to have been eighteen years of age when she 
married. My assumption proved correct, for the patient brought
(31).
me a record of her mother’s death a few days later, from which it 
was easy enough, knowing the year of her marriage, to calculate 
her age at that time. My questions, as I subsequently found out, 
touched upon a complex, and her mistake serves to show how well 
her mother’s marrying age was known to her, though it had not suc­
ceeded into rising into consciousness. If anyone thinks that I am 
here reading a meaning into what has no meaning at all, I can only 
say that such an attitude is neither justifiable nor scientific, 
that the mistakes of everyday life must, a priori, have some ex­
planation, and that until someone can furnish us with psychical 
laws which can be adopted over as wide an area and hold as true 
as those so ably set forth by Freud, then, and then only, can his 
theory and its practical application be questioned. The incident 
recorded above is also an excellent example of that feature in
word-reaction tests known as ’perseveration’, a thing the patient
* A "oompiex* may be defined as a repressed group of emotionally 
toned ideas.
As Jones, in his ’Papers on Psycho-Analysis’ epigrammatically 
says, "In the future, reason will be used to explain things; 
at present, it has to be used to explain them away".
(32).
referred to was particularly guilty of in her subsequent 
associations.
One other matter we may well consider under this 
\ ' 
heading, and for an illustration, I turn to Hamlet( Act 3 Scene
2.). Thus the Player-Queen: -
"Nor earth to me give food, nor heaven light.
Sport and repose lock from me day and night.
To desperation turn my trust and hope.
An anchor’s cheer in prison be my scope,
Each opposite that blanks the face of joy 
Meet what I would have well, and it destroy.
Both here and hence pursue me lasting strife.
If, once a widow, ever I be wife".
The Queen (of Denmark) here interpolates s -
"The lady doth protest too much, methinks".
Precisely J by a process analogous to the phenomenon of
over- determination which I have already commented upon, the
Player-Queen betrays her own mind. In her determination that no
one shall know her true feelings in the matter of second
marriages, she oversteps b©rself; and her vehement denunciation
(35).
only serves to show in what direction her thoughts lie. Many 
people are guilty of this ^^rotesting-too-niuch, and in so 
doing only succeed in laying bare their minds.
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MISTAKES IN %RITING - MISPRINTS.
Mistakes in writing are not made without oause^ and 
furnish us with good examples of repressed desires. When next 
January comes round, we will all probably make the mistake of 
heading our letters January, 1913, thereby signifying our regret 
that another year has slipped past. Similarly, when we are eagerly 
anticipating some event, we frequently mistake Monday for Tuesday, 
Tuesday for Wednesday, and so on. A student may, as the end of a 
term approaches, date back his letters, thereby expressing his 
wish for more time to prepare himself for examination. The com- 
monest mistake made in writing is, perhaps, that of writing the 
first letter or syllable of one word, usually taken from the same 
sentence, instead of that of another. Such mistakes are not to be 
ascribed to chance, haste, inattention or the like. These are 
only predisposing factors, not the cause. Besides, in the commit- 
tance of these errors, haste only succeeds in defeating its own 
object.
(35).
One day, when deep in a hook on mythology, I 
suddenly remembered that I had omitted to write a somewhat urgent 
letter. As I was very interested in the matter I was then read­
ing, I turned over in my mind the possibilities of* postponing my 
letter-writing. Realising this to be impossible, I very reluctant­
ly laid down my book and began to write. Let me now quote the 
lines which I had just read, and which I was so loth to leave 
aside. The tale is that of Isis and Osiris from a chapter on 
Egyptian mythology : -
'She, (Isis) was represented as a woman with the 
horns of a cow. Osiris, her husband or son, for he is regarded 
as both, is killed by his brother Set or Sethi, a being whose 
character answers to that of the Hindu Vritra* etc. Where tvio 
names are offered for the same individual, I instinctively choose 
the more euphonious, and in this instance I selected the form
Sethi for future reference. Turning now to the letter I wrote,
busy
I had therein occasion to remark that my brother was’analysing*
A
(36).
and ’synthetising* certain substances, but when I reached the
*
latter word it recalled to mind the fact that I had seen Jones 
use a different form of the same word, viz,'synthesising'; and 
that when I had come across it, the subject-matter having proved 
so interesting, I ^ad omitted to consult a dictionary as to 
which was the more correct form. I there and then looked the 
matter up, and found that the latter was given the preference.
I therefore proposed to use it, but found on re-reading my 
letter, that I had spelt it thus 'syneethising'.For a time I 
was quite unable to account for this mistake, but if the word I 
wrote be divided up into three syllables, thus, • 8yn-sethiraing, ' 
in the centre is found the name of Osiris's brother, a name 
which I had made a mental note of prior to throwing my book 
aside. My unoonsoious thoughts were with Sethi, and my mistake 
indicates the spirit in which I took up my pen to write.
When furnishing a medical report on some boys, I
recently wrote, 'many of the boys were f ound_ to _be _under&ladl,----
* 'Papers on Psycho-Analysis.
(37).
putting *g* for *o', at the same time showing in what direction 
my sympathy lay* On another occasion, when acting as an assist, 
ant in general practice, I had good reason to complain of the 
poverty of the heating arrangements. I wrote to my principal 
about the matter, and amongst other things said "Surely a man 
is worthy of his fire", substituting 'f* for *h'.
It may here be observed that once a mistake is made, 
re-reading of the script only too frequently fails to reveal 
the error. The unconscious impulse which was the cause of the 
mistake is still potent enough to prevent the attention of the 
writer from being cast in that direction. Hence the value of 
having one's proofs read by a second party.
Misprints are due to the same causes, though they 
are not so easy of explanation owing to the fact that the errors 
may be made by one of several people, the proof-reader, the 
printer, or the writer.
(58).
Punch takes the following from the Scotsman, 'He had 
neither the wealth of the Plantagenets, nor did he derive any 
income from the American trusts (loud daughter)' ; and thus 
comments upon it - 'We knew what was meant without the explana­
tory parenthesis'.
' , -
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MISTAKES IN HEARING AND HEADING - ASSIMILATION.
One of the commonest examples of assimilation is the 
hearing of one’s name in mistake for another’s. The likelihood of 
this is increased by similarity of the names and an anticipatory 
mood* The student, expectant of passing in an examination, may 
fancy he hears his name two or three times when the pass-list is 
being read out#
When submitting a patient to the word-reaction test, 
he mistook the word ’cream’ for ’dream’, and reacted with ’some­
thing going on in the mind’. I mistook this for ’something going 
wrong in the mind’, a most appropriate assimilation on my part 
considering the fact that he had assimilated the test word*
Mistakes in reading, provided the type is clear and 
distinct, furnish us with truer examples of assimilation than 
mistakes in hearing; for in the latter, one must always discount 
the factor of indistinct pronunciation on the part of the speaker.
An assimilation, In Its psychological sense. Is a difficult thing 
to define. All mistakes in hearing and reading are not true
(40).
assimilations , a fact which I have seen no psycho-analyst com­
ment upon. It is true, nevertheless, that one can almost always
instinctively distinguish between a word assimilated and a word
taken up wrongly through bad pronunciation* If a speaker have a
number of people for his audience, all of whom simultaneously
mistake one of his words, ©specially if they do so in the same
sense, there is no assimilation; but if only one or two out of
the number present make the mistake, we are justified in assuming
an assimilation* The sense of hearing of everyone concerned must,
of course, be normal.
One evening recently, when my mind was full of 
the new psychology, I thought I saw, on opening a newspaper, in 
fairly large type the heading ’Freud in Germany’. On looking 
again, however, I saw ’Fraud in Germany’. In this instance no 
blemish could be found in the printing.
The following, from Punch, is also an excellent 
example of pure assimilation* An extract from the Dublin Satur-
Herald reads!’The suffragette leader, looking very pale and
(41).
emancipated, was driven out of prison in a closed carriage’.
Punch comments on this ’Thé wish is father to the look’. So much 
for the misprint; now for the assimilation. On reading the above 
extract and the accompanying comment, I failed to see the point 
of Punch’s remark, so I read the matter once more but with the 
same result. Thinking that I must be unusually dull in the head,
I set mypelf to carefully read the matter a third time. Then, and 
then only, did I notice that the word linked to ’pale’ was 
•emancipated’, and not ’emaciated’, as I had taken it to be. I 
need only add that I am an ardent supporter of the anti-suffra­
gist movement.
On opening my programme at Oovent Garden last 
winter, whither I had gone in company with a friend to see the 
Russian Ballet, judge of my astonishment in seeing the title 
’Les Syphilides’ given to one of three dances. The title was, of 
course, ’Les Sylphides’. My friend made the same mistake and 
correctly interpreted it as the result of a heated discussion we
had had, previous to leaving for the theatre, on the value of
(42).
Balvarsan in the treatment of syphilis. Curiously enough, a 
colleague of mine, who had been present during the discussion, 
and to whom I handed my programme when I returned, remarked to 
me, "Do you know, when I saw that (pointing to the title) at 
first, I thought it was ’Les Syphilides*.
■ -
L'%1
(43).
SÏMBOLIO ACTS.
Symbolism plays a large part in our everyday life. That 
symbolic acts enable us to get a glimpse of a person’s unconscious 
is well known, though the importance of it generally passes un­
perceived* Music is often used to give expression to our complexes. 
For instance, when a person sits down of his own accord at a piano, 
we may justly interpret his unconscious feelings by what he plays.
A good illustration of symbolism is here related* One 
very hot day, having walked far into the country and having had 
nothing to eat Or drink since early morning, I halted at a farm 
house not far from the road, and asked for food. The good lady of 
the establishment very civilly entered into conversation with me, 
and learning that I had travelled far, she bade me come in and be 
deated* Being pleased with my reception, I entered; and while T 
partook of the food and drink set before me, our conversation con­
tinued. In the room in which we were seated was a curtained recess
* Beyond Baker’s Loch, near Drymen.
(44).
leading to an outhouse of the kind so frequently seen in farm 
houses, from which resounded the voice of someone singing 'Coming 
through the Rye*. During a pause in our conversation, the strains 
grew louder and louder, and finally, a young girl entered the 
room, abruptly ceasing her song as she stepped forward and caught 
sight of a stranger. I asked her to continue, but this she would 
not, only busying herself with her work. When I had finished my 
repast, and was about to take my leave, I asked permission to put 
a question to her. To this she readily enough assented, so I asked | 
her if she would tell me why she had been singing. She replied 
**What a question 1 I sing because I am happy". "Yet many people", | 
I said "are happy, and have good voices, but only few sing5 Here 
she vouchsafed no remark, so I continued; "But I am not so concern­
ed about your singing; besides, you have already given me an 
answer" I "but why do you sing that particular song; perhaps you have
good reasons for doing act.«To this she naively replied, as she
beat a hasty retreat through the door by which she had entered,
*And I have"«
(46).
A friend of mine, who was about to get married, 
cam© downstairs to breakfast one morning, whistling the Wedding 
March from Lohengrin. "Surely" I said, "you think it long waiting 
for the 21st. (naming the wedding day.) "As a matter of fact, I do;" 
he said, "but I don't quite follow your remark". I asked him if he 
knew what he was whistling, but it was evident from the pause 
which followed that he did not. He finally succeeded in bringing 
the matter into consciousness, when he i?eal'ised the justification 
of my remark.
/ IThose who have been fortunate enough to see 'Instinct 
a play, by the way, which might have been written by Preud himself, 
so accurately does it portray his theories, must remember the 
incident when the husband, a surgeon, advances towards his wife, 
thinking to embrace her, but only to find that she recoils affright- 
edly, throwing both hands over her eyes. To her husband's "Why, 
what's the matter?", she replies, "Nothing - nothing: I - I saw a 
spot of blood on your cuff". No blood was there, and after demon­
strating this fact to her, her husband says "Come, come, your
(46).
nerves are out of order"! But her false perception is only a 
preliminary to her denunciation of him as one whose hands are 
continually steeped in blood, and proves to be symbolic of the 
mental picture she had of her husband.
While speaking of this play, it is worthy of notice 
that a lapsus linguae occurs in it which is pregnant with 
meaning. The surgeon, in his consulting room, is notified of 
/\ the I ago of the piece, by name 'Walker*, and when he approaches, 
the surgeon says, "Sit dovm. Doctor - eh - Walker, I mean" 
substituting 'Doctor* for 'Walker*, and thus unconsciously ex­
pressing his disapproval of the letter's visit. Her affection, 
too, for the consumptive poet, who is the source of all the 
discord, is but her unsatisfied maternal instinct coming into 
play.
(47).
PROJECTION AND ALLIED MECHANISMS.
The phenomenon of projection, which, as we shall see 
later, is a noticeable feature in many abnormal mental states, is 
also commonly resorted to in everyday life in order to avoid 
touching upon a painful complex* One illustration will suffice. A 
friend of mine one day asked me if I could do anything for a 
fellow-worker of his who suffered much from spermatorrhoea. During 
the latter part of his recital of the case, he said, "Six months 
ago he sought medical advice on the matter, but the doctor has 
failed to treat me with any degree of success". Here I interpolat­
ed "You mean 'him* of course". He at once recognised his mistake 
and added by way of explanation "No, 'me* is correct. I regret I 
misled you, but I felt so ashamed of my condition that I did not 
wish you to know I was referring to myself". Here we have an 
individual who, in order to hide feelings which were a source of 
much mental pain to him, projects them, during conversation, on to 
some non-existent party.
(4 8  ) •
A few other mechanisms, by which a painful complex 
is repressed, may be briefly touched upon. The following lines 
taken from Burns show us how two lovers throw dust in the eyes 
of the world, in order to hide their true feelings for each 
other : -
'Aye vow and protest that ye care na for me.
And whiles ye may lightly my beauty a wee;
But court na anither tho' jokln* ye be.
For fear that she wyle your fancy frae me * *
In a similar way, by the assumption in conscious­
ness of the opposite quality, does an individual counteract 
feelings which are incompatible with his ego, and throw dust, so 
to speak, in the eyes of the psychical censor. The over - 
scrupulous attitude, already cited, which I adopted with regard 
to the payment of accounts is an excellent example of this.
The exhibition of bien-être which we are so
pleased to note in our friends is, alaa, only too often super-
ficlal. and serves but as a cloak to conceal a life of sorrow.
*
'Whistle,and I'll come to you, my lad'.
(49).
It is for this reason that the Jester in the 'Yeoman of the
Guard' ooiamands so much sympathy.
In order to reaoh the same goal, viz, a refuge from intra-
psyohioal conflict, too many people indulge in alcohol.
'Oare, mad to see a man sae happy 
E'en drown'd himsel amang the nappy'. *
In his lectures on Materia Medica, Professor Stockman says that no
one indulges freely in alcohol without having some psychological
necessity for doing so: and Trotter speaking of alcoholism, says
"almost universally regarded as either, on the one hand, a sin or
a vice, or, on the other hand, as a disease, there can be little
doubt that it is essentially a response to a psychological
necessity. In the tragic conflict between what he has been taught
to desire and what he is allowed to get, man has found in alcohol,
as he has found in certain other drugs, a sinister but effective
peacemaker, a means of securing, for however short a time, some
way out of the prison-house of reality back to the Golden Ap;e".
*
Tam o'Shanter. 'Herd Instinct', Sociological Review, 1909.
(60).
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II* Their relation to ahnonaal mental phenomena#
•He concluded by paraphrasing Hamlet, "There are 
more things in heaven and earth, doctor, than are 
dreamt of in your psychiatry"•*
Brill*s •Paychanalysis’, page 185*
( s i ) .
The lot of the alienist is, in one respect at least, 
not a happy one; he has to be content with few, if gratifying re­
coveries. îtor has it ever been otherwise throughout the history of 
insanity* Is it, then, that the maladies which are his special care 
are not, for the most part, amenable to treatment, or is it that 
the poverty of his recovery list is due to the lack of a proper 
understanding of such abnormal phenomena as present themselves for 
treatment T Recent advances in psychology point to the latter as 
being the more correct inference. If this be so, then there is yet '
no need for us to join the ranks of the materialists^ there is yet
*
no need for us to say with Stoddart : -
"The pith of the whole matter is this: that among savage 
peoples the interests of the individual are subordinated to those 
of the race and natural selection is at work; while among civilized 
nations the interests of the race are subordinated to those of the 
individual, natural selection is allowed no play, and
Mind and its Disorders*
is the survival of the unfittest. This Is the tfUe oatfie of .the
increase of insanity; it lies under our very hands. The medical 
responsible
man is himself^for the increase of disease and the degeneration 
of the race. The physician who specializes in mental diseases is, 
or should be, a comfort and a blessing to his present patients, 
but he is a curse to posterity*.
With the exception of that brief period when Hippo­
crates endeavoured to give to insanity a definite scientific 
footing, the first or demonological conception held sway until the; 
middle of the eighteenth century. At the end of that century, the |
I
physiological conception had taken firm root and may be said to ; 
continue to hold the field at the present day. Much was, and is, 
expected, though but comparatively little has been gained, at 
least, as far as increasing the percentage of recoveries is con­
cerned, from this conception of insanity. Its main contention is 
that mental changes are dependent on, and proceed pari passu with,
physical changes. This conception may eventually prove to be the 
Correct o#9, but that it certainly is not, from the point of view
(65).
of the psychiatrist, a very encouraging one, must be admitted by
even its most ardent supporters. The ’mens sana in corpore sano*
dictum has its origin in a physiological conception of insanity;
and yet, it has always seemed strange to us that so many people
are admitted to asylum wards who bear little or no clinical
evidence of an unsound body. If an unsound mind is the reflex of
an unsound body, one would expect to find a large proportion of
asylum patients confined to bed for one reason or. another. That
*
this is not the case here is evidenced by the following, taken
from the latest Commissioners’ Report ; - ’The number of patients
confined to bed at the time of our visit amounted to 187, or about
7*4 per cent of the total in residence. They included several
oases so confined for mental reasons, amongst which were the most
recently admitted patients. It is not sufficient to account for
the discrepancy existing between theory and fact by saying, as
some have the habit of saying, that the clinical evidence of a 
physical lesion is not forthcoming because the means at our
*
Oolney Hatch Asylum.
Recent admissions are, of course, confined to bed, irrespective 
of their physical condition.
(54).
disposal for eliciting certain lesions are yet too meagre for 
that purpose. This is only begging the question. Leaving on one 
side cases of congenital mental defect, of epilepsy, of general 
paralysis of the insane, and of insanity with grosser brain 
lesions, there exists a large number of cases in which we have, 
as yet, no legitimate reason to infer'a brain lesion; nor is the 
evidence on the post-mortem table sufficiently weighty to account 
for the abnormal phenomena observed.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, 
a new school of psychologists arose in France. These, with Janet 
at their head, developed the psychological conception of insanity 
and since then great strides have been made in this direction by 
Kraepelin, Jung and Freud. Tliis more recent conception; which, 
si non è vero, è ben trovato, has cast abroad a more hopeful 
spirit in psychiatric circles. Much good work has already been 
done abroad in attacking insanity from this standpoint; but in 
this conservative country of ours, the views of the new psycho­
(55).
logists seem to gain favour but slowly. It is with the view of 
demonstrating, in normal and abnormal states, the wide applica­
bility of some of the Freudian mechanisms, that this thesis has 
been undertaken.
As we had occasion to mention already, if the 
ordinary individual is asked for an explanation of the mistakes 
which he makes in everyday life, he at once retorts either, that 
they are due to chance, haste, or inattention, or, that they 
are causeless; and, in any case, he regards the person who seeks 
to interpret them as one to be laughed to scorn. The adoption 
of this attitude is simply due to the fact that he can find no 
better reason for his error. Why ?. Because the cause is hidden 
from him; it lies there in his unconscious, and, being there, 
does not for him exist. His nearest approach to a correct 
answer is to ascribe such mistakes to what are, after all, only
predisposing factors.
ïïm this attitude of the ordinary individual
(56).
with regard to the mistakes of* everyday life is a very apposite 
illustration of the attitude adopted by the average sane man 
towards the delusions of his insane brother. In one breath, a 
lunatic describes himself as a multi-millionaire, and, in the 
next, begs for a sixpence to buy tobacco. The sane brother, who 
is listening attentively the while, goes home and writes a 
chapter on the irrationality of the lunatic. As a matter of fact, 
the insane person will give us a better show of reason for his 
delusion than will the ordinary individual for his mistake.
This is but natural, for in both cases, the rationalisation is 
produced subsequently, and we have yet to meet the sane man who 
can rationalise as well as the deluded lunatic. The truth of the 
whole aajbter lies, of course, in the fact that reason does not 
play such a large part in relation to mental processes as it is 
thought to do. Both the mistake and the delusion have their 
origin and their rationality somewhere out of the reach of
*
Of. p. 3.
(57).
consciousness, via, in unconscious feelings* The truth of this
statement need not be pressed home by the quandary, familiar
enough, in which a politician finds himself, in seeking to make
his party opponent ’see reason*.
Let us now direct our attention to the subject
of repression and repressed desires. While endeavouring to obtain
a psychical cause - trauma - for hysterical manifestations,Preud
formulated the following theory ; - " Through my psychic work I
had to overcome a psychic force in the patient which opposed the
pathogenic idea from becoming conscious". The reason for this
resistance on the part of the patient is owing to the fact that
the pathogenic idea is always accompanied by an affect of shame,
reproach, mental pain, or a feeling of injury. We have seen how
well this theory of repression holds good in the trivial mistakes
of èyeryday life; and if we now pause to consider exactly what
happens when a pathogenic idea strives to enter consciousness, we 
e
’ selected Papers on Hysteria and other Psychoneuroses*, p. a?.
(68).
can then see how far the theory applies to abnormal mental 
phenomena.
When an: Idea is found to be inoompatiblè with our ego, 
i.e., when it is a pathogenic idea, the ego may treat it in one of 
several ways. If the affect accompanying the idea is not a strong 
one, the ego does not stoop, as it were, to repress such an idea, 
but merely treats it, as far as possible, as non-arrivé. The two 
ideas are maintained, but separately so, in consciousness. This 
is the explanation of 'Dissociation of Consciousness *, a concep­
tion which is by no means confined to abnormal mental states.
When a person plays a skilful hand at Bridge, and attempts, at 
the same time, to solve some abstruse problem, for example, in 
metaphysics, he exhibits dissociation of consciousness, inasmuch 
as two ideas occupy his field of consciousness at one and the 
same time. Here, however, the dissociation is temporary, partial, 
and subject to the will of the individual; whereas, in abnormal 
mental states the dissociation is no longer under control, is
complete if temporary, and only too frequently is found to be
(89).
permanent» Closely associated with this conception, but quite 
distinct from it, is the dissociation of the stream of conscious 
ness. In normal mental life, the idea, which, at any given 
moment, holds sway in consciousness, is intimately connected 
with that which preceded it and with that which follows it. If 
this be not so, then there is interruption or dissociation of 
the stream of consciousness.
Let us now return to our deluded friend who
describes himself as a millionaire and yet asks for a sixpence.
■rf' !•pie ideas which centre around his delusion, being incompatible
with those which centre around his ego, are shut off from the
latter by the process of dissociation; at the same time, the
dissociation of consciousness prevents the patient from
becoming aware of their incompatibility. If, however, his
attention is called to the absurdity of his position, or if he
has a keen insist into his own mental condition, he obviates
the difficulty in which he is placed by means of rationalisa-
(00).
tions. In so doing ho is only acting like the normal person who. 
When accused of inconsistency in his actions, pours forth a
'
volley of reasons in order to explain away his conduct. It is 
in rationalisations that secondary delusions have their origin.
It may now be worth our while to enquire why a 
patient should have a delusion, and having one, why it is some­
times a delusion of grandeur, sometimes a delusion of unworthi­
ness. We have seen that in the psychopatholQ§ioal acts of every­
day life our mistaJces are determined by our unconscious feelings 
or desires, which, having taken advantage of such predisposing 
factors as haste, inattention and the like to elude the 
psychical censor, have, in order to find expression, risen into 
consciousness. We have also noted that a painful complex may 
be repressed by the assumption in consciousness of the opposite 
quality, that a life of sorrow is often concealed beneath a 
smiling face; and that one of the main reasons, at anyrate, 
for indulgence in alcohol is the avoidance of intrapsychical 
conflict. Let us now consider another phenomenon which presents
{61)-
Itself in the daily life of the individual, viz., day-dreaming. 
Day-dreaming is a mechanism to which we resort in order to give 
expression to our unconscious desires. When we are unsatisfied 
with reality, when our present position in life is incompatible 
with our Insatiable ego, we seek relief from the intrapsychical 
conflict by building castles in the air; we are no longer 
bound down by facts, but in imagination satisfy all our wants.
As Brill, when speaking of repressed desires, says "To-day 
there are no more worlds to conquer, but we are all Alexanders, 
none the less. Each of us who is not afflicted with the emotion­
al deterioration of the Schizophrenic is dominated by ambitions 
and is never perfectly contented...... We want much, and we get
comparatively little, but we never stop wanting."
The delusions of the insane are of the same nature 
as the phantasies of the normal individual. Delusions of grand­
eur are , in this light, self-explanatory ; delusions of un-
woptjR^ jr^ sss. however, do not at first sight seem to tally with 
*
*Psychanalysis, its theory and practical application *. p. 40.
(e s ) .
this explanation; but a moment's consideration shows us that such 
delusions always touch upon a strong religious complex, and are 
to be regarded as a negative expression of the desire for future 
happiness; they are but the exaggerated developement in conscious, 
ness of opposite repressed feelings. As we have noted above, 
delusions of persecution have their origin in rationalisations; 
and, as we would expect, are exhibited by sdch patients as have 
some insight into their own mental condition.
How far this conception of delusions has taken 
us is manifest by reading the following lines taken from 
eStoddart; 'We have just seen that all, who suffer from delusions 
lack insight; and from the investigation of patients we find that 
the converse usually (sic) holds good, that those patients who 
lack insight almost invariably suffer from an insane delusion, ?- 
and that those who have insight do not '. We cannot agree; we 
maintain that secondary delusions can only arise where the
ipatient has sufficient insight into his own condition to 
*
*Mind and its Disorders' p. 149
recognise that his primary delusion is incompatible with his ego 
Our millionaire friend who finds himself unable to purchase 
tobacco solves the absurdity of his position by assuming that 
someone has robbed him of his money. Thus, the insight which the 
patient has into his own condition is the basis of the delusion 
of persecution.
Hallucinations are to be regarded in the light 
of a dissociation of consciousness, the ^voice' being the dis­
sociated or split-off portion addressing the main body of the 
personality. How much sounder this conception of an hallucina­
tion is than that adopted in current text-books is best 
evidenced by a reading of the following passage, in which the 
writer in endeavouring to bolster up the physiological concep­
tion of insanity, has only succeeded in getting himself inextrio.
*
ably mixed up. Again we quote from Stoddart : *The deaf, but
not th« oonganitally d.af, ars especially liable to halluoina- 
tjons of hearing....... Auditory hallucinations are, as a rule.
*
Op. Cit., p. 110,
(64).
of evil prognostic significance; the exceptions to this rule may 
sometimes be recognised by getting the patient to ascertain
whether he can still hear the sounds when his ears are stopped* In 
the majority of cases they are no longer heard; but if they still
persist, the prognosis is more favourable since the patient either
believes or may be reasoned into the belief that the sounds are 
hallucinatory...,.....#.. Hallucinations of both vision and heazv? 
ing are most frequent at night when all is dark and quiet'. Here
we have the statement that, when their ears are stopped, the
majority of hallucinated patients no longer hear hallucinatory 
sounds. Apart from the fact that our limited experience flatly 
contradicts this assertion, it is tantamount to saying that, if 
we felt so inclined, we could relieve patients of their hallu­
cinations, by depriving them of their sense of hearing. But how 
does this coincide with his first statement that the deaf ( not 
the congenitally deaf, mark you ) are especially liable to hallu­
cinations ?. Again, his statement, which we believe, that
(65).
auditory hallucinations are most frequent at night when all is
Tv
dark aT^ d quiet, i.e. when the conditions are such as most resem­
ble a stopping-up of ears, does not, to put it mildly, in any way 
strengthen the view that a patient's hallucinations disappear when 
his ears are stopped. Furthermore, to attempt to reason a patient 
into the belief that the sounds which he hears are of an hallucin­
atory nature is as great folly as to try to reason a patient into 
the belief that he is suffering from an insane delusion, and is 
attended with as beneficial a result.
Dissociation of consciousness, while it does not 
account for an obsession, explains the relation it bears in con­
sciousness to the ego. As we shall see later, the ego regards the 
obsession as absurd, but at the same time does not subject it to 
repression for a very definite reason.
It now remains for us to see in what way the ego 
treats pathogenic ideas which are accompanied by strong affects.
In such cases, the idea, having been refused direct admission into
(66).
oonaoiousnass by the psyohioal censor, declares war on the main 
body of the personality, and an intraphysical conflict ensues. 
This may result either favourably or unfavourably to the indiv­
idual. In the normal course of events, the ego thoroughly ap­
preciates the incompatibility existing between the pathogenic 
idea and itself and consciously selects one or other of the 
alternatives. This is a right and proper solution of the dif­
ficulty . In other cases again, the pathogenic idea is modified 
sufficiently to render it no longer incompatible with the ego: 
this also is a natural reaction to conflict. One of two other 
results, however, both of which are abnormal and terminate 
unfavourably to the individual, may take place. The first of 
these is best explained by considering how an obsession is 
formed, and the 'washing mania' to which we previously referred 
serves as a good illustration for this purpose. A young woman, 
admitted to this asylum last year, was found to be suffering 
from an obsession of this kind. Six months previous to her 
admission she had given birth to an illegitimate child, and
(67)
(and^the oiroumstsinces arising in connection with this event had
been a source of great mental pain to her. The set of ideas
centring round her moral lapse constituted a psychical trauma;
and her ego, finding such ideas incompatible, repressed them. The
repression was for the most part successful, but the affect of
*
unoloanliness being a strong one, it detached itself from an idea 
which was being subjected to repression, and, in order to find 
expression in consciousness, attached itself to another indiffer­
ent idea, in this case no longer in the psychic, but in the 
physical sphere. In washing away a stain from her hands, she, 
like Lady Macbeth, is symbolically washing away a stain from her 
conscience. It may here be mentioned that when the patient had 
the obsession explained to her in this light, the constant wash­
ing of the hands ceased and has not since been resumed. More of­
ten the affect is simply transferred from one idea to another in 
the psychic sphere; but it is here worthy of note that Preud
e Of. p. 6.
**. Op. cit., p. 3.
(G&).
regard» the somatic innervation of hysteria as the result of a 
previously received psychic trauma, and he speaks of the trans­
ference of an affect from the psychic to the physical sphere as 
the process of 'conversion'. The advantage thus gained by the 
ego in the case of an obsession is less than in the case of 
hysteria, inasmuch as in the former, though the pathogenic idea 
is repressed, the affect still remains potent after transference; 
whereas in the latter, psychic excitement becomes mere bodily 
innervation.
The various phobias have their origin in the same 
mechanisms as obsessions, so that we may speak of hysteria on |
the one hand, and, obsessions and phobias on the other, as having
a psychogenetic origin.
The second and more drastic method which is em­
ployed by the ego towards a pathogenic idea accompanied by a
strong affect is best illustrated by a consideration of what
happens in acute mental conditions such as the acute confusional
( 6 9 ) .
states, bases of complete autopsychic amnesia, and the acute 
maniacal states of folj^ circuj^ire. In such acute states the 
ego, wearied by the constant strain of suppressing the painful 
complex, is finally, though temporarily, overcome by it. Even so, 
however, the mechanism of repression still holds good, for when 
the complex erupts into consciousness, the ego retires from the 
conflict, and leaves it in entire possession of the field. It is> 
in these cases that dissociation of the stream of consciousness 
occurs. When an individual merges into an acute hallucinatory 
psychosis the complex dominates the field of consciousness, and 
he remembers little or nothing of his former existence. Similar- L; 
ly, when the complex retires, the ego resumes its wonted position 
and takes up the thread of life where it left off.
The phenomenon of 'projection', which, as we have 
seen, is a common feature of everyday life, furnishes us with 
another reaction of the mind towards a repressed complex. The 
painful pathogenic ideas, being incompatible with the ego, are
(70).
projacted on to soia© other person vdier© they can be more conven- 
iently rebulcad. As Hart says, "Throughout all ages 'the woman 
tempted me' has been the stock excuse of erring man": and this 
mechanism of avoiding intrapsychical conflict is a characteris­
tic feature not only of chronic alcoholism and dementia praecox, 
but is perhaps the main feature of paranoia. The persecutory 
delusions of the paranoiac are projected repressed complexes, the 
pathogenic wish being thrown on to some other, mayhap, non­
existent individual who is then regarded as a tormentor.
The phenomenon of 'introjection* which is also a
I
common feature of everyday life and which is exhibited in excess^ 
ive sympathy displayed without due cause, is the exact opposite 
to that of projection and is a characteristic feature of the 
psychoneurotic.
We hope we have succeeded in demonstrating the 
bearing whibh the psychopathology of everyday life has upon mor-
* Psychology of Insanity, p. 122.
(71).
bid mental phenomena, it has enabled us to find a reasonable 
^explanation for many things which have been too long been re­
garded as meaningless or absurd. Yet one more illustration.
When making a mental examination of a female patient, the last 
not© on whose case sheet, typical of the others which preceded 
it, ran as follows, 'In statu quo, dull and demented. Bodily 
health fair', we found very little evidence to show that the
dementia was ©notional and not genuine in character, until on 
asking the
^ patient to waken up and take a little more interest in her sur­
roundings, we received the startling answer, which taught us a 
severe lesson, "But, doctor, how can I find time to take inter­
est in my surroundings ? I am busy enough as it is "• That many 
so-called cases of dementia are not genuine cases of dementia, 
but are what Hart refers to as cases of emotional dementia, is 
well known* We are all aware that a 'demented' patient period- | 
ically acts in an extremely rational manner, and it is this
*
Of. p.9. Ibid, p. 87
(72). I
% , . I
which has led Brill to say that dementia praecox is often j
■ ... ■ . I
neither a dementia nor yet a praecox. j
To sum up, we are too ready to regard the isolate^I
phenomena which are presented to us in the insane states in the | 
same light s.s the ordinary individual regards the erroneous men­
tal functioning of everyday life. We forget that the sane and th< 
insane are subject to the same psychical laws, and that the
difference in their mental states is one of degree only. As 
■»*
Kohnstaam, speaking of the relation existing between conscious 
and unconscious mental processes, says ; " The biological way 
of thinking sees in the facts of consciousness only mountain- 
peaks, which soar into sight over a sea of mist, while the 
mountain as a whole - the totality of vital phenomena - remains 
hAd*^en from the immediate consciousness. xX one confines oneself 
to the view from above, there appears to be no natural connect­
ion, no regularity. If, however, one disregards the mist that
Op* cit., p. 125. Q»9t©d by Jones, op. cit., p. 95, from the 
Journ. f. Psychol, u. Heurol, Bd. 18.S. 101.
(73).
oonoeals the base, one recognises how the mountains rise from 
the plain and have a common basis. One attains the scientific 
insight of the unity of what, under chance conditions was 
partly visible, partly invisible".
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
0#0*0#0*0* 0# 0*0
Freud. 'The Interpretations of Dreams'.
'Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory' & (with Breuer), 
•studen uber Hysteria' which is incorporated in 
'Selected Papers on Hysteria & other Neuroses*.
(Translations by Brill).
Brill. 'Psychanalysis, its theory & practical applications'.
Jones. 'Papers on Psycho-analysis'.
Hart. 'The Psychology of Insanity'.
Stoddart.'Kind & its Disorders'.
Trotter. 'Sociological Application of the Psychology of 
Herd Instinct'. Sociological Review, 1909.
Reproduced with permission of copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
